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Introduction1
This article attempts to explain the causes of  the main economic crises 
that have occurred since 1929. A crisis is defined as any episode in which the 
GDP per capita of  an economy, in real terms at purchasing power parity, re-
mains below the highest annual level previously reached. The GDP per capi-
ta estimates made by Angus Maddison are the main source of  data. For re-
cent years these estimates are linked to OECD figures.
Two research hypotheses are proposed: first, that excessive financial spec-
ulation plays a central role in major crises; and second, that the magnitude of 
crises increases when governments adopt misguided policies, which can turn 
a crisis into a major slump.  Excessive speculation is generally the result of 
outbreaks of  euphoria among economic agents, who rather than having ra-
tional expectations are driven by animal spirits and the contagion of  opti-
mism. Financial intermediaries often contribute to feeding the bubble by pro-
viding easy credit. As Keynes, Kindleberger, Minsky and other authors have 
noted, overly optimistic expectations can push stock market and real estate 
assets to short-term prices far above their long-term values and lead econom-
ic agents to assume risks and levels of  debt that turn out to be unsustainable 
1. This paper was presented at the 17th World Congress of  the International Economic 
Association (Dead Sea, 2014). I thank the participants in this meeting for their comments. I 
am also grateful for the financial support provided by the Ministry of  Economy and Compe-
titiveness of  the Government of  Spain through project HAR2012-33298: “Cycles and indus-
trial development in the economic history of  contemporary Spain, 1790-2012”.
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when the bubble bursts.2  Immediately following the collapse of  asset prices, 
debts grow, credit becomes scarce, and expectations are deflated. Real invest-
ment evaporates due to the combined effect of  tightening of  credit, waning 
animal spirits, and the spread of  pessimism. Hence governments should im-
plement policies aimed at managing demand, opting for expansionary poli-
cies when the main risk is a low level of  output, and contractionary policies 
at the point in the cycle when markets are becoming overheated.
For this analysis, 12 economies representative of  the global economy were 
selected in order to identify the most significant slumps at the global level. 
The economies chosen represent North America (the United States), Latin 
America (Argentina,  Brazil and Mexico,), the industrial core of  Europe (the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France), the European periphery (Sweden 
and Spain), and Asia (India, China and Japan). The first step in the analysis 
was to determine how many countries met the condition of “crisis” as defined 
above (GDP per capita below the previous peak) for each year from 1928 to 
2012. This exercise provides a simple but powerful indicator of  how global 
the crises have been. The result is represented graphically in Figure 1 below.3
2. Among the works by these authors, I consider the following particularly relevant: Key-
nes (1930 and 1936), Kindleberger (1973 and 1978), and Minsky (1975 and 1982).
3. The original GDP per capita figures for each country are expressed in 1990 interna-
tional Geary-Khamis dollars, at purchasing power parity, and are taken from works by Mad-
dison (1995 and 2006). Maddison’s data have been linked to real growth rates for real GDP per 
capita (2005 prices) and population, provided by the OECD. The series obtained from the Mad-
dison/OECD data have been used to create Figures 1–9, for which I am solely responsible.
figure 1 ▪ Global crises, 1928-2013: number of economies in crisis (GDP per capita 
below previous peak) -sample 12 economies
Source:  By the author, from Maddison and OECD. See Note 3.
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Our global crisis indicator reaches its highest value during the 1930s, thus 
confirming that this was indeed the decade of  the Great Depression. The 
worst point was the three-year period from 1931 to 1933, when 11 of  the 12 
sample economies were in crisis. The graph also suggests that the recovery 
which took place after 1933 was not sustained, and that it was only after 1945 
that the downward trend in the extent of  the crisis became unequivocal.
In contrast, the indicator shows a clear downward trend from the mid-
1940s to the early 1970s. From 1970 to 1973 there was only one country in 
crisis. The results suggest that during the period defined as the Golden Age 
of  European growth, crises at the global level practically ceased to occur.
From 1974 the trend changed again. Two shocks, around 1975 and 1982, 
can be identified. Half  of  the sample economies were in crisis at both of  these 
times. Though shorter in duration and less global than the one in the 1930s, 
these crises broke the pattern of  the golden age.
In the first half  of  the 1990s, we can observe another global slump that 
reached a peak in 1993, with eight of  the 12 sample economies in crisis. Like 
the crises of  the mid-1970s and early 1980s, this one was short-lived, but it in-
volved a greater number of  countries.
The new century began with a relatively mild warning that affected a third 
of the sample in 2001–02. There followed a number of years of  apparent calm 
before the world sank into another slump in 2008. The downturn reached its 
nadir in 2009, when ten of  the countries in the sample recorded a GDP per 
capita below its historical high. In 2013 a third of  the sample economies were 
still in crisis. Given the intensity of  the slump in 2009 and its relatively long 
duration, we consider it the most serious crisis to have hit the global econo-
my since the 1940s. 
In this article, we examine some of  the slumps that have had the greatest 
global impact and use the methodology of  comparative history to test the hy-
potheses stated above concerning the origins of crises and the role of econom-
ic policy. We analyse significant countries with similar starting conditions and 
different policies. In the next two sections, we focus on comparing the impact 
of  the Great Depression of  the 1930s in the centre and the periphery. Later, 
we compare the crises of  stagflation. Finally, we analyse the crises of  deregu-
lation and the present situation, which many have dubbed a Great Recession, 
but which, given its duration and intensity, might better be described as an-
other great depression.
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The Great Depression of the 1930s in the centre
The first part of  our analysis focuses on countries that had high levels of 
income per capita when the Great Depression hit.4 First, we compare the ex-
perience of  the United States and Germany, two countries that were similar 
in size and had comparable levels of  GDP per capita, and both of  which were 
epicentres of  the Depression. We then compare what happened in the United 
Kingdom and France, which are similar in size and had comparable income 
levels, but which implemented diametrically opposed policies.
Up until 1931, the world was dominated by what has been called the 
Genoa consensu.  The participants in the Genoa Conference, held in 1922, 
passed a series of  resolutions, including one calling for the restoration of  a 
system of currency convertibility based on fixed gold parities, and another 
that stressed the importance of  pursuing balanced budgets. As a result, most 
countries returned to the gold standard in the second half  of  the 1920s and 
attempted to reduce their public deficits. These policies also held sway in the 
early 1930s, because it was believed that the gold convertibility of  currencies 
and the free circulation of  the metal would automatically correct any macr-
oeconomic imbalances.
The crisis originated in the United States and was caused by excessive 
stock market speculation. The index of  share prices on the New York Stock 
Exchange increased from 93 in May 1926 to 193 in May 1929: an annual 
growth rate of  27 per cent over the three-year period. Meanwhile, the growth 
rate of  GDP per capita (i.e. the real economy) was only 1.5 per cent annually. 
The imbalance between the two rates was clearly unsustainable. In many cas-
es shares were purchased on credit provided by brokers and banks, and when 
the cycle turned in October 1929 stock traders were unable to realise expect-
ed profits. Many were left insolvent and also dragged down those who had 
recklessly lent them money. Credit contracted, interest rates rose, and defla-
tion spread from the stock market to the rest of  the domestic economy. As 
deflation took hold and the cost of  money rose, expectations were deflated, 
animal spirits were depressed, and investment contracted. The US slump 
spread to the rest of  the world as a result of  the drop in US imports and tight-
ening of credit (which some countries had already been experiencing since the 
peak months of  the stock market expansion).
4. The main works used to compare the way the Great Depression progressed in indus-
trial countries, in addition to those cited in Note 2, are as follows: Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963), Sauvy and Hirsch (1984), James (1986 and 2009), Barkai (1990), Louat and Servat 
(1995), Temin (1989 and 1990), Overy (1994), Eichengreen (1995), Bernanke (2000), James (ed.) 
(2002), Henry (2003), Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009), Margairaz (2009), and Parejo and 
Sudrià (2012).
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The enactment of  the Smoot-Hawley Tariff  in June 1930 may have con-
tributed to spreading the Depression to the rest of  the world, but it is gener-
ally agreed that the action taken by the Federal Reserve in September 1931, 
which interrupted its expansionary monetary policy, made the situation worse 
in the United States. Herbert Hoover’s policy of  raising taxes the same year 
and his rejection of the proposal to create an unemployment benefit and com-
pensate war veterans also gave fiscal policy an excessively contractionary bias. 
As a result, the US economy continued to contract in 1932 and 1933. 
Germany experienced the cancellation of  credit as a result of  the Wall 
Street Crash, and the Reichsbank raised interest rates in an effort to halt to 
the flight of  gold. Chancellor Heinrich Brüning also had to deal with the in-
solvency of  first Austrian, and later leading German banks. But his prefer-
ence for fiscal adjustment led to a worsening of  the crisis. In 1931, he sharply 
reduced salaries in the civil service, cut unemployment benefits, increased tax-
es on tobacco and beer, and backed wage cuts in the private sector. As a re-
sult, by 1932, German GDP per capita had fallen by about 17 per cent from 
the 1929 level. With over 6 million unemployed, Brüning ended up being re-
placed by Franz von Papen, who began to make changes to government pol-
icy. But Papen could not prevent the electoral rise of  the Nazis, which led to 
Adolf  Hitler’s accession to the chancellorship in January 1933. 
National Socialist governments gave priority to public works, focusing 
first on reforestation and expenditure on road infrastructure (Autobahnen) 
and railways. Public spending later grew as a result of  the drive to rearm the 
country. Although Hitler did not officially declare his rejection of  the gold 
standard, strong control of  exchange rates (which included the adoption of 
multiple rates) led to de facto abandonment of  the system. Furthermore, in 
figure 2 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (1929=100)
Source: By the author, from Maddison. See Note 3.
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1933 the Chancellor announced that outstanding loans would not be repaid 
(with the exception of  those provided through the Dawes and Young Plans), 
and the following year he declared a complete moratorium on foreign debt 
service. Strong fiscal expansion enabled Germany to emerge from the crisis 
from 1935 as the Third Reich’s motorisation programme was openly trans-
formed into an expansion of  the war industry. 
In the United States, Franklin Roosevelt’s victory initially led to the imple-
mentation of an expansionary policy that broke with the Republican ap-
proach. In March of 1933, the same year he took office, Roosevelt abandoned 
the gold standard, allowing the dollar to depreciate. He facilitated farm cred-
it and mortgage lending, created the Tennessee Valley Authority to boost con-
struction of dams and power stations, allowed minimum wages to be estab-
lished in industry, supported banks in exchange for their agreement to separate 
commercial and investment banking (Glass-Steagall Act), and ratified the So-
cial Security Act, which introduced unemployment, disability and old-age ben-
efits, as well as providing for the compensation of war veterans. This strongly 
expansionary policy paved the way for recovery from 1934, but Roosevelt still 
believed a balanced budget was important. In 1937, when GDP per capita was 
still below the 1929 level, the Democrat government sought to achieve a budg-
et surplus, triggering another recession the following year. Consequently, Ame-
rica had still not fully recovered when the Second World War broke out.
The contrast between the policies implemented in the United Kingdom 
and France is even more significant. In 1931, the National Government formed 
by Ramsay MacDonald adopted the most radical measure possible for a coun-
try that had championed gold for over two centuries when it decided in August 
to allow the pound to depreciate. This measure was complemented by an ex-
figure 3 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (1929=100)
Source: By the author, from Maddison. See Note 3.
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pansionary monetary policy consisting of  continuous interest rate cuts. Fur-
thermore, the British Empire Economic Conference, held in Ottawa in 1932, 
marked another shift for a power that had traditionally advocated free trade. 
Protective tariffs were raised to discriminate in favour of  trade between the 
dominions and colonies of  the British Empire. As a result, in 1931, Britain 
became the first major industrial nation to start recovering. It was also the 
first major Western country to pull out of  the Depression (after Sweden). By 
1934, GDP per capita had recovered to the 1929 level, so the Great Depres-
sion only lasted four years in Britain.
At the opposite extreme we find the other great European empire of  the 
time: France. During the 1930s, the country experienced major political in-
stability and governments were short-lived. Even before the formation of  the 
Popular Front, though, there was universal agreement on the importance of 
pursuing a balanced budget and maintaining the gold standard. One of  the 
most dramatic steps was taken by Pierre Laval, who in 1935 attempted to im-
pose deflation by decree (what we would now call internal devaluation). He 
cut the salaries of  civil servants by 10 per cent, reduced rents, forced down the 
price of  bread and coal, and lowered gas and electricity rates. Laval also tried 
to reduce wages in the private sector and increased the tax burden on high-
income earners. Despite his efforts, all he ended up achieving was another re-
cession: GDP per capita in 1935 was 14 per cent below the 1929 level. It was 
not until Léon Blum accepted the devaluation of the franc in September 1936 
that France started to recover.
The Great Depression of the 1930s in the periphery
In this section we analyse the impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s 
on peripheral economies, comparing the trajectories of  two countries in Lat-
in America and two in Asia.5 First, we consider the case of  Argentina and 
Brazil, both of  which had a low level of  industrialisation and a high degree 
of  trade openness when the Depression hit. As a result of  the crisis, both 
countries experienced a huge drop in exports, a drying-up of  foreign credit, 
forced suspension of  the gold standard, and a drift towards authoritarianim. 
The difference was that Argentina implemented a severe adjustment and gave 
priority to servicing its foreign debt with Britain, whereas Brazil suspended 
debt repayments from September 1931.
5. In my analysis of  the Great Depression in the periphery, the following works were par-
ticularly helpful: Díaz Alejandro (1980), Maddison (1985 and 1992), Rothermund (1988, , 1992 
and 2012), Thorp (1985 and 1998), Richardson (1999), Lynch (2001), Sivasubramonian (2002), 
Rapoport (2005), Reinhart and Rogof (2009), Marichal (2010), Wolfe (2010), Kudaisya (2011), 
Roy (2011), and Belini and Korol (2012).
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In Argentina, exports and foreign credit contracted in the course of  1929, 
and the external imbalance led the government of  Hipólito Yrigoyen to or-
der the closure of the Caja de Conversión in December, which was tantamount 
to abandoning the gold standard. In September 1930, the radical Yrigoyen, 
the father of  the country’s nascent welfare state, was overthrown in a military 
coup that brought Lieutenant General José Félix Uriburu to power. Uriburu 
tried to restore budgetary balance by cutting spending and increasing reve-
nue. To reduce expenditure, he cut salaries in the public administration and 
brought new public works to a standstill. To boost revenue, he increased tar-
iffs, inheritance tax and stamp duty, as well as introducing new income and 
fuel taxes. He also pledged to continue servicing both foreign and domestic 
debt. The government introduced exchange controls, but continued to author-
ise outflows of  gold to service foreign debt. As a result of  these policies, GDP 
per capita in Argentina fell sharply: in 1932 it was 19 per cent below the 1929 
level. 
Agustín Pedro Justo became the president of  the republic in 1932. Al-
though the tax burden remained high, at the end of  1933, a system of multi-
ple exchange rates was introduced and the currency was devalued by 20 per 
cet.  The exchange-control system continued to give priority to servicing for-
eign debt. In fact, the Roca-Runciman Treaty, signed with Britain in 1933, in 
addition to reducing duties on two hundred British articles, required Argen-
tina to fully service its foreign debt. In return, Britain agreed to import a min-
imum tonnage of  meat equal to the average for 1931–1932, a condition that 
served the interests of  ranchers of  the Argentinean pampas.
Argentina’s GDP per capita began to recover in 1933, but the improve-
ment was extremely slow. The Central Bank of  Argentina, in which the gov-
figure 4 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (1929=100)
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Source: By the author, from Maddison. See Note 3.
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ernment had a limited influence, was established in 1935. In 1936, the Roca-
Runciman Treaty was renewed and Argentina continued to give priority to 
servicing its foreign debt with Britain. In 1938, the price level was still below 
that for 1929, and when the Second World War broke out, Argentina’s GDP 
per capita had still not risen above the 1929 level.
In Brazil, President Washington Luís Pereira de Sousa, who represented 
São Paulo coffee interests, pursued an orthodox budgetary policy and tried 
to maintain the gold standard until the country’s reserves ran out in October 
1930. Like Yrigoyen in Argentina, Washington Luís was overthrown by a mil-
itary uprising, led in this case by Getúlio Dornelles Vargas, the governor of 
the cattle-raising state of  Rio Grande do Sul. However, those who had seized 
power in the two countries pursued markedly different policies.
Vargas served as interim president until 1937, later becoming a self-con-
fessed dictator and proclaiming the Estado Novo (New State). From 1931, 
Vargas implemented measures to support agricultural income, based on pur-
chasing coffee and destroying any surplus production. In September, he de-
clared a moratorium on foreign debt, suspending debt payments to the Unit-
ed States and orienting the country’s trade relations towards Germany. He 
implemented expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, doubled Brazil’s 
road mileage between 1930 and 1938, and passed a law to establish a social 
security system for urban workers. 
In 1931, Brazil’s level of  GDP per capita was 13 per cent lower than it had 
been before the crisis started. However, the policies pursued by Vargas facili-
tated a rapid recovery. Unlike Argentina, Brazil emerged from the crisis in 
1936, at which point the price level was 28 per cent higher than in 1929.
India and China, two much poorer peripheral economies with higher pop-
ulations, also experienced very different results due to the radically different 
policies they pursued. Because their economies were less open than those of 
the Latin American countries, the impact of  the Depression was much less 
severe. However, while colonial India was gradually dragged into the Depres-
sion, China followed a clearly expansionary path during the period.
In British India, the onset of  the Depression coincided with the launch 
of  the second Satyagraha campaign by Mahatma Gandhi. The economic de-
mands set out, which coincided with those of the Federation of Indian Cham-
bers of  Commerce and Industry, included proposals to devalue the rupee, 
protect the cotton industry, reduce land tax, and end the salt tax. George 
Schuster, finance minister of  the Council of  India, came to support the pro-
posed devaluation of  the rupee, but received orders from Britain to adopt a 
deflationary policy. London devalued the pound in 1931, but was unwilling 
to allow the rupee to depreciate against the British currency. On the contra-
ry, colonial authorities imposed an extremely deflationary fiscal policy. This 
meant reducing salaries in the public administration, increasing consump-
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tion and income taxes, raising tariffs, and cutting back on public works (which 
had a particularly significant impact on railway construction and irrigation 
works). The colonial government did not declare a debt moratorium and 
continued to service its foreign debt. The price level fell by 35 per cent from 
1929 to 1935.
As a result of this policy, India’s GDP per capita, which in 1930 had not 
fallen by even 1 per cent from the 1929 level, continued to contract through-
out the 1930s. According to Maddison’s estimates, in 1938, India’s GDP per 
capita was 8 per cent below the 1929 level. This decline was not entirely the re-
sult of the deflationary policy adopted: fluctuations in harvests and the coun-
try’s high birth rate were also contributing factors. However, the massive in-
ternal devaluation imposed on India did nothing to stimulate growth. 
Unlike British India, China was independent. However, in 1928 the coun-
try was just coming out of a period of civil war, with the victory of Chiang 
Kai-shek, and was about to experience another insurrectionary period with 
the uprising of the Red Army in 1930 and Mao Zedong’s Long March, which 
began in 1934. A further complication was Japan’s seizure of Manchuria from 
China in Chiang Kai-shek’s policy was by necessity expansionary because 
the Kuomintang government had a limited ability to enforce tax collection 
in the country as a whole and could not avoid high deficits. However, China 
regained sovereignty by cancelling some foreign concessions and abolishing 
foreign extraterritorial rights. The country had experienced foreign debt mor-
atoria in the 1920s, and in the 1930s there were further delays in debt service. 
The Kuomintang also decided to increase customs duties, which by 1936 were 
almost four times higher than they had been in 1929. All of  these measures 
helped stimulate domestic demand and industrial expansion, which was quite 
significant until the Japanese attack in 1937.
figure 5 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (1929=100)
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Source: By the author, from Maddison. See Note 3.
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In contrast to India, China never adopted the gold standard; its monetary 
system was based on silver. Up until 1931, the price of silver fell against gold, 
which contributed to the depreciation of the yuan. In contrast to what hap-
pened in its Asian neighbour, prices in China rose by 23 per cent from 1929 to 
1931. Chinese competitiveness began to suffer the consequences of the pound 
and the yen abandoning the gold standard in the previous year, followed by 
the US currency in 1933. This situation resulted in outflows of silver and a 
drop in Chinese prices from 1931 to 1934. In 1935, the Kuomintang decided 
to introduce a fully fiduciary monetary system (based on the faˇbì), and pro-
hibited the circulation of silver yuan. The issue of banknotes pushed prices up 
again and they ended up skyrocketing during the Japanese invasion of 1937. 
Despite political instability, an emphasis on monetary and fiscal expan-
sion favoured the growth of  the Chinese economy during the 1930s. China 
was largely unaffected by the international depression until 1933, and a poor 
rice harvest was a significant factor behind the decline in GDP recorded in 
1934. GDP per capita had recovered again three years later.
In summary, the cases studied in Latin America and Asia corroborate the 
fact that in a crisis of  effective demand and deflation, like the one that oc-
curred in the 1930s, the countries that adopted expansionary policies, such as 
Brazil and China, were able to recover from the crisis. In contrast, Argentina 
and India, countries that pursued deflationary or internal devaluation poli-
cies, were plunged into the abyss.
Stagflation crises in the 1970s and 1980s
As pointed out above, there was a downward trend in the number of  cri-
ses after the Second World War and at a certain point they practically ceased 
to occur. In our sample, the number of  economies in crisis went from 11 in 
1945 to just one in 1970–1973. We cannot digress to offer an in-depth analy-
sis of  the factors that explain the absence of  crises during this economic gold-
en age, but we will highlight two reasons we see as critical, both of  which re-
late to the legacy of Keynes. First, the Bretton Woods system gave governments 
autonomy to decide their macroeconomic policy, a freedom of action they 
lacked when the gold standard was in place. This allowed for devaluation and 
the imposition of  controls on capital movements. Second, during the war 
most Western governments adopted demand-management policies: when real 
growth was at risk, they tended to implement expansionary fiscal or mone-
tary policies, and when the threat was inflation, they reduced budget deficits 
or raised the cost of  credit.
Excessive money printing by the Federal Reserve and speculation against 
the dollar contributed to the erosion of  the Bretton Woods system, which 
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ended up collapsing between 1971 and 1973. However, in this case specula-
tion was not the main factor that brought an end to the golden age or the rea-
son why half  of  the economies in our sample were once again immersed in a 
widespread crisis by 1975. The price of  a barrel of  oil quadrupled as a result 
of  an embargo imposed by OPEC countries in the wake of  the Yom Kippur 
War. The growth of industrial economies during the second technological rev-
olution was based on increasing consumption of  hydrocarbons, which could 
not be replaced by another energy source in the short term. The dramatic 
price hike significantly increased costs and intensified the distributive strug-
gle among Western economies. It also caused an outbreak of inflation and re-
duced rates of  profit, which led in turn to a fall in investment. The decline in 
capital formation put an end to the exceptional growth rates recorded during 
the golden age. Thus the economic situation that prevailed from the early 
1970s to the mid-1980s is described as one of  stagflation: stagnation com-
bined with inflation. The stagnation was not overly pronounced, economies 
did grow during this period, but at much lower rates than those seen between 
1945 and 1973.
The combination of relatively high inflation rates and falling growth rates 
(which meant the return of mass unemployment in many countries) presented 
governments with a dilemma for which Keynesianism offered no clear solu-
tion.6 The question was whether to focus on controlling inflation by imple-
menting contractionary policies, or to stimulate demand in order to tackle un-
employment. It is important to note that unlike the Great Depression, when 
there was a general deflationary trend, in the crisis of the 1970s, in a climate 
of price acceleration, one could hardly speak of a lack of effective demand. 
Industrial countries were split on how to deal with this dilemma. During 
the first oil shock, most economies opted to implement expansionary policies 
that accelerated inflation. Countries like Germany and Switzerland, which 
gave priority to controlling inflation, were the exception. However, their ex-
perience showed that the costs in terms of  growth (and unemployment) were 
lower if  the acceleration of  inflation was halted at the outset rather than de-
laying, only to end up causing a recession in order to curb spiralling inflation. 
Thus, when the second oil shock hit in 1979–1980 as a result of  the overthrow 
of the Shah, there was more of  a consensus in the West that the focus should 
be on controlling inflation.
We will now consider two further comparisons to support the thesis that 
during the period of  stagflation avoiding price growth from the start yielded 
6. Some of the key works I have used to analyse the stagflation crises are: Maddison 
(1985 and 1992), Rowthorn and Glynn (1990), Pekkarinen, Pohjola and Rowthorn (1992), Cár-
denas (1996), Carlin (1998),  Thorp (1998); Buchheim (1999), Woodward (1999), Tomlinson 
(2004), Von Tunzelmann (2004), Rapoport (2005), Brenner (2006), Eichengreen (2007), Rougier 
and Belini (2008), Marichal (2010), and Belini and Korol (2012).
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better results in terms of  growth. First, we will contrast the experience of 
West Germany and the United Kingdom, highly industrialised countries with 
comparable levels of  per capita income. We will then analyse the case of  Mex-
ico and Argentina, two peripheral countries that both pursued import-sub-
stitution strategies during the post-war period, but which had quite different 
inflationary experiences in the 1970s and 1980s.
In 1973, the United Kingdom had just entered the EEC. The Labour gov-
ernment of  Harold Wilson allowed inflation to rise from 9 per cent in that 
year to 25 per cent in 1975. The following year, Wilson resigned and was re-
placed by James Callaghan. The new prime minister had to negotiate a finan-
cial assistance package with the IMF, which would entail significant cuts in 
public spending. He managed to reduce the growth rate of the consumer price 
index to 8 per cent in 1978, but labour unrest and discontent were growing. 
These circumstances paved the way for Margaret Thatcher’s victory in 1979.
Inflation accelerated again during the second oil shock, but somewhat less 
than it had in the mid-1970s: 1980 closed with an increase in the cost of  liv-
ing of  nearly 18 per cent. In addition to closing mines, the Tories facilitated 
the sale of  council houses to private individuals and privatised railways, abol-
ished controls on capital movements, and implemented a drastic fiscal and 
monetary adjustment. By 1983, they had brought the inflation rate down to 
5 per cent, but for the first time since the Great Depression, the number of 
unemployed had risen above 3 million.
Fiscal policy in Helmut Schmidt’s West Germany was quite expansionary 
during the first oil shock (the deficit was 6 per cent in 1975), but the sole ob-
jective of  the Bundesbank since its establishment was to maintain price sta-
bility, and the bank kept interest rates relatively high in 1973 and 1974. Also, 
figure 6 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (1972=100)
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the SPD’s tradition of  corporatist negotiation prevented the kind of  labour 
unrest seen in Britain. As a result, in the worst moment of the oil shock (1973) 
the inflation rate in Germany was just 7 per cent.
Since inflation did not get out of  control, the Bundesbank gradually re-
duced interest rates in West Germany. The overnight interbank rate went from 
10 per cent in 1973 to just 4 per cent in 1976. At the end of  1976, the annual 
growth rate in the consumer price index was less than 4 per cent and the in-
flation rate was even lower than in 1972. 
During the second oil shock, the Bundesbank again raised interest rates. 
The overnight interbank rate rose from 3 per cent in 1978 to 11 per cent in 
1981. This drastic increase was related to the shift toward monetary tighten-
ing implemented by Paul Volcker at the Federal Reserve. 
In Germany, the most inflationary period during the second oil shock was 
1981, when consumer prices rose by 6 per cent. The rate was moderate and it 
was not necessary to undertake an adjustment like the one implemented in 
Britain (and other countries, including Italy and Spain). Germany could still 
afford the luxury of closing the budget with a relatively high deficit (4 per cent 
of  GDP). In 1981, German GDP per capita was 18 per cent higher than the 
1973 level, whereas in Britain there had only been a 6 per cent increase over 
the same period. Eleven per cent of  the workforce was unemployed in the 
United Kingdom, compared to only 4 per cent in West Germany. The CDU 
returned to power in 1982 after the liberals abandoned their SPD partners. 
However, unlike the British conservatives, the new administration did not make 
a radical break with the policy of the previous government headed by Schmidt. 
They continued to combine negotiated wage agreements with prudent mon-
etary policy, while maintaining relatively high levels of  social expenditure.
Another effect of the oil shocks was to create large deposits of dollars and 
other currencies, from payments for oil, in branches of banks that did not op-
erate in their countries of origin. The so-called Eurodollar market was outside 
the regulation of national governments and experienced a major expansion 
thanks to increased deposits by oil exporters. In the 1970s, this market, which 
contrary to standard practice at the time lent money at variable interest rates, 
provided emerging countries with large loans that appeared to be backed by 
strong guarantees. Animal spirits came into play in decision-making on lend-
ing, and there was a generally rosy view of the future solvency of  recently in-
dustrialised countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, and communist 
countries like Poland, Hungary and Romania. 
Mexico, for example, had undergone an intense process of  industrialisa-
tion from 1939 to 1973 based on import substitution. Unlike the vast major-
ity of  European countries, Mexico was an oil producer and in theory should 
have benefited from the spike in oil prices in 1973–1974 and 1979–1980. In 
the event, during the presidencies of  Luis Echeverría and José López Portil-
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lo, Mexico’s foreign debt continued to rise. A high-spending administration 
and short-sighted international banks allowed Mexico’s public debt to increase 
from $4.3 billion in 1970 to $68.5 billion in 1982. However, from the point 
when Paul Volcker changed the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve in 
1979, the cost of servicing the debt became increasingly burdensome. Finally, 
one weekend in August 1982, the finance minister, Jesús Silva Herzog, an-
nounced in Washington that without immediate help the country would not 
be able to meet its upcoming debt maturitie.  Mexico’s foreign debt crisis erupt-
ed and immediately spread to other large debtors such as Brazil. The debt of 
these countries had to be refinanced by the IMF and other sources of public 
money, while banks that had previously lent freely now pulled out of Latin 
America in disarray. 
Mexico’s expansionary excesses in the 1970s are another clear case of  er-
roneous policy, as evidenced by the fact that inflation gradually rose from 6 
per cent in 1972 to a dramatic 61 per cent in 1982. However, without the easy 
credit provided by short-sighted banks with mistaken expectations, the astro-
nomical levels of  indebtedness reached by the Latin American nation would 
not have been feasible. 
López Portillo announced the nationalisation of  banks in September 
1982, but in the end, the country had no choice but to implement severe ad-
justments during the six-year term of Miguel de la Madrid. When the presi-
dent took office in 1983, he adopted contractionary and liberalisation meas-
ures to curb inflation, which was running at 90 per cent. The process of  debt 
renegotiation required adjustments throughout the decade and, despite sub-
stantial debt reduction under the Brady Plan, Mexico was still in crisis in 1990 
when President Carlos Salinas de Gortari proposed the North American Free 
Trade Agreement. The announcement of  the deal improved expectations and 
led to a new period of  euphoria in terms of  capital inflows, leading eventu-
ally to the so-called Tequila crisis in 1994–1995. Only three years later did 
Mexico’s GDP per capita rise above the pre-crisis level. Thus the Mexican 
debt crisis did not result in a lost decade, as has often been said: the slump 
actually lasted around 16 years.
However, the handling of  the crisis could have been worse. Although the 
sheen of  the golden age had not been quite as bright in Argentina as else-
where, like Mexico the country had undergone rapid industrialisation based 
on import substitution between 1946 and 1974. The Justicialist Party returned 
to power in 1973 under the leadership of  Héctor Cámpora, and Juan Domin-
go Perón himself  returned from exile. At the time, Perón was a supporter of 
Argentina’s social pact, but labour unrest was on the rise and the public def-
icit reached 6 per cent of  GDP. The elderly leader died in 1974 and his wife, 
Isabel Perón, took over as president. The year closed with an inflation rate of 
24 per cent, in line with that of  some industrial countris.  However, a spiral 
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of strikes and the lax policy of  Isabel Perón’s finance ministers allowed infla-
tion to rise to 182 per cent in 1975 and 444 per cent in 1976. The crisis also 
hit the real economy in these two years.
The military seized power again in 1976 and established a National Reor-
ganisation Process headed by General Jorge Videla. Despite its undeniable 
political authoritarianism, the military dictatorship chose an extremely liber-
al finance minister, José Martínez de Hoz, who signed an agreement with the 
IMF in August 1976 and imposed a brutal economic adjustment that includ-
ed wage freezes, cutting the public deficit, reduction of  tariffs, and liberalisa-
tion of  interest rates. The new minister managed to cut the deficit from 14 per 
cent to 3 per cent of  GDP and reduce the inflation rate to 259 per cent in 
1979, but the real economy collapsed and the country began a dramatic proc-
ess of  deindustrialisation. 
From late 1978 to 1981, Martínez de Hoz adopted a system of pre-an-
nounced currency depreciation (the tablita), but the system had only a limit-
ed impact on price developments. The tablita policy encouraged capital flight, 
and the country’s external indebtedness rose from $12 billion in 1978 to $33 
billion in 1981. Once again international banks were happy to finance a coun-
try that seemed to take seriously the recommendations of  supply-side eco-
nomics and rational expectations theorists.  
After a brief  interlude when the country was under the command of Gen-
eral Roberto Viola, Leopoldo Galtieri became the head of  the military junta 
in late 1981. The conflict with the United Kingdom over the Falkland Islands 
once again accelerated the rate of  inflation, which went from 105 per cent in 
1981 to 165 per cent in 1982. As a result of  the Mexican debt crisis, Argenti-
na also received a new IMF loan so that it could continue servicing its debt. 
figure 7 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (1972=100)
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But inflation soared to 343 per cent in 1983. GDP per capita remained low; 
when the dictatorship ended it was 11 per cent below the 1974 level.
In December 1983 a new, democratically elected president —the radical 
Raul Alfonsín— took office, but he was unable to prevent the inflation rate 
from reaching 671 per cent in 1984. The Austral Plan appeared to contain in-
flation in 1986–1987, but expansionary excesses at the end of  Alfonsín’s term 
led to another upward spiral in prices. In 1989, the year of  the transition to 
the presidency of  Carlos Saúl Menem, Argentina ended the year with an in-
crease in prices of  more than 4,000 per cent, that is, hyperinflation.
The Justicialist president implemented a rigorously neo-liberal programme 
based on privatisations, spurred on by Mercosur, and deregulation. His fi-
nance minister, Domingo Cavallo, who was appointed in early 1991, succeed-
ed in turning around inflationary acceleration by restoring a convertibility 
system that fixed the dollar-peso exchange rate at one peso per US dollar. Ar-
gentina had an inflation rate of  0 per cent in 1996. The defeat of  hyperinfla-
tion was an undeniable success, but the fixed exchange rate with the dollar, 
combined with the impact of  devaluations by Brazil, generated new problems 
of  competitiveness in Argentina towards the end of  the twentieth century, 
leading ultimately to the corralito (a partial freeze of  bank accounts).
In short, a series of  expansionary excesses and the need for dramatic ad-
justments to curb bouts of  inflation caused Argentina’s GDP per capita to 
remain below the 1974 level for nearly two decades. These excesses, which 
were not the direct result of  import substitution, also led to the country’s in-
dustrial decline. 
The first crises of deregulation and European unification
The experience of  the 1970s and 1980s had shown that expansionary pol-
icies did not work in the medium term in a context of  high inflation. Howev-
er, the best results achieved by prudent responses to the evolution of  the price 
level during the crisis were interpreted —I believe wrongly— as a defeat for 
Keynesian principles. The prevailing view among academics and politicians 
(the so-called Washington Consensus) was that rather than managing de-
mand, governments should free markets of  any state intervention.  Although 
the Argentine experience tended to refute this view, many industrial countries 
followed the lead of  Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom and focused 
on deregulation.7
7. To examine the crises associated with deregulation and the process of  European mo-
netary unification, I have used the following works, among others: Osugi (1990), Pekkarinen, 
Pohjola and Rowthorn (1990), Fitoussi (1996), Korpi (1996), Rothermund (1998, 2008 and 
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The East did not escape this shift towards deregulation. In this section we 
will begin by comparing the recent experience of Asia’s two great democracies: 
Japan and the Republic of India. Both countries underwent deregulation proc-
esses from the 1980s onwards, but while Japan implemented changes rapidly 
without placing any limits on speculative excesses, India introduced greater 
market competition gradually, without completely breaking with the mixed-
economy model that had been adopted by the Indian National Congress par-
ty after the country gained independence in 1947.
During the economic golden age, Japan had grown very strongly by im-
porting technologies developed in the West during the second industrial rev-
olution and adapting them to the local context. A national innovation system 
and a distinctively Japanese institutional framework had contributed to im-
proving Western technologies. The reforms imposed by General MacArthur 
sought to put an end to the zaibatsu (family-controlled holding companies), 
but special relationships between industrial companies and banking houses 
were rebuilt in the post-war period, giving rise to the keiretsu. Cross-share-
holding ensured group companies privileged access to credit. These coopera-
tive ties between industry and finance were reinforced by the strategic policy 
of  the Japanese Ministry of  International Trade and Industry (MITI).  Dom-
inant cooperative relationships, strongly influenced by the legacy of  Confu-
cianism, also included suppliers and workers. The latter were guaranteed jobs 
for life, and salaries were strongly linked to seniority. The deregulation of  the 
capital market around 1984 was intended to give banks the freedom to oper-
ate without government-imposed restrictions. Interest rate ceilings on depos-
its were eliminated, barriers between commercial and investment banking were 
removed, and banks were allowed to borrow abroad.  In a country with little 
land in relation to its population, banks threw themselves into financing the 
real estate sector, spurred on by a sharp reduction in interest rates by the Bank 
of  Tokyo. They also focused on financing stock exchange transactions, which 
in the short term offered much higher yields than industry thanks to the me-
teoric rise of  the Nikkei index. 
The resulting property and financial bubble in Japan led countless fami-
lies to sign two-generation mortgages. At one point, the square mile surround-
ing the Emperor’s Palace in Tokyo reached a value equivalent to that of  all 
the land in the state of  California. The market capitalisation of  Japanese list-
ed companies ended up exceeding that of  all US corporations, even though 
 
2012), Krugman (1999 and 2012), Catalan (2002 and 2012), Stiglitz (2003), Brenner (2006), 
Panagariya (2008), Eichengreen and O’Rourke (2009), James (2009), Koo (2009), Chang (2004 
and 2010), Roubini and Mihm (2010), Amatori and Colli (2011), Kobrak and Wilkins (2011), 
Kudaisya (2011), Parejo and Sudrià (2012), Boyer (2013), Louçã and Mortágua (2012), Comín 
and Hernández (2013), Fitoussi and Saraceno (2013) and Llopis and Maluquer (2013).
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the Asian country had less than half  the population of  the USA. Japanese 
banks enthusiastically provided unlimited credit for property purchases and 
stock exchange transactions in a manner that evoked the Keynesian animal 
spirits that had driven the 1929 bubble. And the end result was similar. 
After the bubble burst, the Nikkei index gradually fell from almost 40,000 
points at the end of  1989 to 15,000 points in 1992, and just 8000 points in 
2003. Commercial property prices in Japan’s six major cities declined by 87 
per cent from 1990 to 2004. 
The Japanese government implemented a strongly expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policy, as Keynes would have recommended. The short-term inter-
est rate was lowered from 7.7 per cent in 1990 to 0.6 per cent in 1996. The budg-
et went from a surplus of 2.9 per cent of GDP to a deficit of 4.2 per cent over 
the same period. Although the policy could not prevent a fall in the Japanese 
growth rate, it did help ensure that GDP per capita declined only in 1993. 
In 1996, inflation in Japan was negligible (0.1 per cent growth in the cost 
of  living). Nevertheless, in 1997, the government of  Prime Minister Ryutaro 
Hashimoto (like Roosevelt in 1937) attempted to balance the budget by in-
creasing the consumption tax rate and social security contributions, eliminat-
ing deductions on income, and reducing public spending. This policy, which 
remained in place in 2001 under the Koizumi Cabinet, aggravated the bank-
ing crisis and led to the longest decline in Japan’s GDP per capita since the 
1950s (from 1998 to 2002). Subsequent governments adopted a more expan-
sionary policy, but the situation became critical once again when the global 
slump began in 2008. From 1950 to 1990, Japan’s GDP per capita grew at an 
average rate of  5.9 per cent annually. In contrast, since 1990 it has risen at 
an average rate of  just 0.9 per cent. Rapid deregulation and lax monetary pol-
icy in the second half  of  the 1980s and misguided attempts to achieve fiscal 
consolidation at the end of  the century stifled Japanese growth.
After gaining its independence, India pursued a strategy of  import-sub-
stitution industrialisation, first undertaken by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1947, and 
intensified by his daughter, Indira Gandhi, from 1966. Growth in GDP per 
capita was much slower than in the more open, industrialised economy of Ja-
pan, averaging only 1.4 per cent annually from 1950 to 1980. However, this 
was still a significant improvement on the period of  British rule, when GDP 
per capita had remained stagnant from 1890 to 1947.
Lack of  competition, made possible by a very restrictive system of invest-
ment licences known as the “Permit Raj”, made industry in India very un-
competitive at the international level and caused the country’s global export 
share to fall from 2 per cent in 1947 to just 0.4 per cent in 1980.  However, im-
port substitution in the Asian country did not create the kind of  extreme im-
balances experienced in Latin America. At the worst point in the turbulent 
1970s (1974), inflation was 28 per cent, a rate similar to that recorded in the 
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bad years in the European periphery, and negligible compared to the rates 
seen in Mexico and Argentina. Although India borrowed from international 
lenders and ended up requiring assistance from the IMF, when the Mexican 
crisis broke out, foreign debt per capita was much lower than in Latin Amer-
ican countries: $39 per capita in India as opposed to $1,261 per capita in Ar-
gentina in 1983.
India began a period of  gradual reforms that did not break sharply with 
the import-substitution model or the mixed-economy approach that had been 
advocated by the Congress Party since the end of British rule. After his moth-
er’s assassination by her Sikh bodyguard in 1984, Rajiv Gandhi abolished 
the licence system in 30 industries, promoted the creation of  joint ventures 
with foreign capital, and intensified efforts to reign in price growth. Although 
the Congress Party lost the 1988 elections and Nehru’s grandson handed 
over power, the annual inflation rate had been reduced to just 7.5 per cent by 
that time.
India experienced its most recent major crisis in 1991. The country had 
borrowed excessively between 1988 and 1991 and its foreign debt had risen 
from 55 to 79 per cent of GDP. In 1990, Indian emigrants left the Gulf as a 
result of the war that followed the invasion of Kuwait, and external reserves 
plummeted. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by the Tamil Tigers in the mid-
dle of the 1991 election campaign contributed to a lowering of expectations.
Following the return of the Congress Party to power the same year under 
the leadership of Narasimha Rao, Manmohan Singh was appointed finance 
minister. Singh, an economist trained at Cambridge University, took reforms 
further. He definitively abolished the Permit Raj, reduced tariffs, facilitated 
foreign investment, and substantially devalued the rupee. Industry and servic-
figure 8 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (1990=100)
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es responded positively to this package of incentives. Since then, the country 
has experienced accelerated expansion in areas related to the third technolog-
ical revolution, such as software production and telecommunications, as well 
as more traditional areas (from diamonds to cars and pharmaceuticals).  
In 2004, following the election victory of  a coalition led by the Congress 
Party, Singh was chosen as prime minister. He has continued along the path 
of  reform without breaking completely with the legacy of  the past. Inequal-
ity on the subcontinent has continued to decline since the 1970s. The mixed 
economy has stood up well, with government-owned corporations in the 
banking sector, the steel industry, and the energy and rail sectors. From 1990 
to 2011, India’s GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of  5 per cent. By pur-
suing gradual reforms and avoiding speculative excesses, India was able to 
shift from slow to rapid growth. As a result of  rapid deregulation and ram-
pant speculation, in Japan the opposite happened.
Turning our attention once again to the West, there have been three ma-
jor crises since the triumph of deregulatory policies in the United States and 
Europe: the slump of the early 1990s, the crisis associated with the bursting 
the dot-com bubble around the turn of  the century, and the current major 
slump, which began around 2007.  According to our indicator, the two crises 
that have had the greatest impact are the first (eight economies) and the last 
(ten economies). We will therefore focus on these two slumps. However, be-
fore turning to this final comparison, it should be noted that yet again the 
worst moments of  crisis were preceded by intense speculation. Before 1993, 
investment funds bet in favour of  the Deutsche Mark and against the weaker 
currencies of  the European Monetary System (EMS), such as the pound and 
the currencies of  Mediterranean and even Nordic countries. In the second 
half  of  the 1990s, the frenzy focused on shares in technology companies in-
volved in information processing and transmission. In the early 2000s, spec-
ulation revolved around subprime mortgages and was facilitated by the repeal 
of  the Glass-Steagall Act in the United States and financial innovations such 
as securitisation. These three bouts of  euphoria gave rise to broader crises 
that varied in intensity according to the imbalances generated and the poli-
cies adopted to tackle them.
In Europe, the surrender of monetary sovereignty, part of a half-hearted 
move towards unification, has been an additional and particularly damaging 
element of instability. The criteria agreed at Maastricht in 1991, intended to 
pave the way for monetary union, were a key factor behind the intensity of the 
crisis of the early 1990s. The adoption of the euro and the fact that most cen-
tral banks in the European Union have given up the right to issue their own 
currency has also been a major factor in the magnitude of the current slump. 
In order to test the theses set out above, we will compare the case of  Swe-
den and Spain, two EU countries that drew very different lessons from the 
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crisis of  the 1990s, and whose policies clearly diverged towards the end of that 
decade. Sweden, though a member of  the EU since 1995, has never given up 
its right to issue kronor, whereas Spain abandoned the peseta with the faith 
of  a true believer.
In the second half  of  the 1980s, Sweden had low inflation, a budget sur-
plus, an extremely low unemployment rate (1.5 per cent in 1989), and one of 
the lowest levels of  inequality in the world. However, the Social Democratic 
government of  Ingvar Gösta Carlsson chose to change direction, abandon-
ing the path that the country had followed since the 1930s. The domestic fi-
nancial system was deregulated, exchange controls on capital transactions were 
eliminated, and a fiscal counter-reform that reduced direct taxes and progres-
sivity was implemented. These measures resulted in a major housing boom. 
Also, in 1991 the krona entered the EMS with a narrow fluctuation band of 
1.5 per cent.
It was in 1991 that the real estate and financial bubble burst. GDP per 
capita fell and the first bank rescue took place. The Social Democrats lost the 
elections and were replaced by the conservative cabinet of  Carl Bildt, who cut 
public spending, raised taxes, imposed privatisations, and pursued a tight 
monetary policy to maintain the parity of  the krona within the EMS. During 
the monetary storm that hit late in the summer of  1992, the Sveriges Riks-
bank increased the discount rate to an astronomical 500 per cent to defend 
the krona against attacks from speculators. In September the institution was 
able to withstand the pressure, but only by massively increasing the cost of 
money. In November, the situation became unsustainable and the krona left 
the EMS, becoming a free-floating currency again.
As a result of the policies adopted, investment fell by 17 per cent in 1993. 
The unemployment rate climbed to 8.2 per cent, and a quarter of banks had to 
be bailed out with public funds. The budget deficit grew to an astronomical 15 
per cent of GDP in 1994, and by 1996 the public debt had reached 73 per cent 
of GDP. Sweden experienced the longest crisis in its history. It was not until 
1996 that GDP per capita rose above the 1991 level, which means the country 
went through a five-year slump. In contrast, the crisis of the 1930s lasted only 
three years in Sweden (which abandoned the gold standard along with Britain). 
The depth of  the crisis favoured the return to power of  the Social Demo-
crats under the leadership of  Carlsson. In 1996 he was succeeded as prime 
minister by Göran Persson, who up until that time had been the finance min-
ister. To tackle the ballooning deficit and debt, Persson increased the tax bur-
den on high-income earners and capital and cut military spending. Corporate 
agreements, which are characteristic of  the Nordic model, facilitated control 
of  inflation. As the economy recovered, the deficit was reduced and in 1998 
the budget was back in surplus. The Swedish government decided not to re-
join the EMS, so it was not part of  the majority group of  EU countries that 
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adopted the single currency in 1999. The Swedish people confirmed this re-
jection of  the single currency in a referendum held in 2003. At that point, 
Sweden was continuing to run a budget surplus and the public debt had fall-
en to 51.7 per cent of  GDP. Persson had reaped the rewards of  exercising fis-
cal discipline during a period of  growth, as recommended by the Keynesian 
paradigm.
Outside the euro, Sweden recorded a GDP growth rate that was quite ac-
ceptable for a rich country (2.5 per cent annually for 2000–2007). The debt 
shrank to 45.3 per cent of  GDP in 2006. Despite these good results, in 2006 
John Fredrik Reinfeldt emerged victorious in the Swedish general election as 
the leader of  the Alliance for Sweden coalition. The Scandinavian country 
has not been able to completely avoid the impact of  the current slump, be-
cause it depends on the level of  activity of  its European partners. However, 
at the worst point in the downturn (2009), Sweden’s GDP per capita was only 
10 per cent below the 2001 level. According to our criteria, Sweden emerged 
from the crisis in 2011. In April 2013, the unemployment rate was just 8.4 per 
cent. The contrast with the trajectory of  the so-called PIIGS or GIPSI coun-
tries in the European periphery could not be more revealing.
Spain joined the EMS in 1989 with a fluctuation band of  6 per cent and 
a central parity that overvalued the peseta. In a country experiencing higher 
inflation than its trading partners, this exchange rate could only be main-
tained thanks to increasing foreign capital inflows in the years leading up to 
the Olympic Games in Barcelona. Despite high growth over this period, the 
government of  Felipe González did not reduce the public deficit; in fact, it 
rose from 3.3 per cent of  GDP in 1988 to 4.3 per cent in 1992. Moreover, one 
of  the macroeconomic convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty 
for future members of  the monetary union was the observance of  the normal 
fluctuation margins provided for by the EMS exchange-rate mechanism for 
at least two years without any parity changes.
When speculators attacked weak currencies in the zone and caused the 
monetary storm of 1992, Spain was one of  the first members to devalue its 
currency (in September of the Olympic year). Successive devaluations contin-
ued until 1995, and the country also benefited from a broadening of  the EMS 
fluctuation band to 15 per cent, which in practice meant the abandonment of 
a fixed-rate system.
During the crisis, the deficit rose to 6.7 per cent of  GDP in 1993, and un-
employment reached 23.7 per cent of  the workforce in 1994, while the public 
debt was over 66 per cent of  GDP. The 1993 slump had a relatively mild im-
pact on Spain’s GDP per capita thanks to the effect of  the depreciation of  the 
peseta on external trade. However, high unemployment, which was still run-
ning at 22.2 per cent in 1997, paved the way for the victory of  the Popular 
Party in the general elections held that year.
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The first government of  José María Aznar reduced the deficit by pursu-
ing a broad programme of privatisations and was able to reduce the budget 
deficit to 1.0 per cent of  GDP in 2000. The public debt declined to 59.4 per 
cent of  GDP, the inflation rate was around 3.5 per cent, and unemployment 
fell to 10.8 per cent of  the workforce.
Strong growth in the last five years of  the twentieth century was driven 
largely by the devaluations of  1992–95. Despite this, conservative and social-
ist politicians, along with the vast majority of  Spanish academics, eagerly em-
braced the single currency. Unlike their counterparts in Sweden and the Unit-
ed Kingdom, decision-makers in Spain were unwilling to learn from the crisis 
of  the early 1990s. Few mourned the death of  the peseta or the transfer of 
monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank. 
Aznar’s second government and the first one headed by José Luis Rodrígu-
ez Zapatero benefited from the false euphoria generated by accommodative US 
monetary policy and the initially high expectations generated by the adoption 
of the euro. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and Alan Greenspan’s deci-
sion to lower interest rates in 2001 (in response to the bursting of the technol-
ogy bubble), combined with innovations such as securitisation, facilitated the 
rise of subprime mortgages. These developments gave rise to a new financial 
and real estate bubble in the West. Moreover, in the euro zone, downward con-
vergence of interest rates led the peripheral countries to increase their indebt-
edness at a dizzying pace. In the case of Spain, this madness was particularly 
strong due to intense migratory flows in the early 2000s. In the Iberian Penin-
figure 9 ▪ Indices of GDP per capita in 1990 GK $ (2001=100)
Source: By the author, from Maddison and OECD. See Note 3.
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sula the euphoria also reflected the animal spirits that were driving decision-
making in financial institutions. Savings banks had been deregulated around 
1990 and grew at a frenetic pace by opening branches throughout the country 
and concentrating their assets in mortgages and loans to property developers.
Governments took advantage of  strong growth up to 2007 to reduce the 
deficit and the debt of  public authorities. At the end of  the year, there was a 
budget surplus of  2 per cent of  GDP, and public debt fell to just 36.3 per cent 
of  GDP. Inflation, though, was always significantly higher than in Spain’s 
major trading partners, France and Germany.
Nevertheless, in the run-up to the 2008 elections and in 2009, the govern-
ments of  José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero took the deficit to a level that was un-
precedented in modern history: over 11 per cent of  GDP. Although inflation 
was close to zero and a certain degree of  fiscal expansion could be justified, 
the magnitude of  the stimulus was excessive. Most importantly, the fiscal ex-
pansion did not take into account the fact that the Bank of  Spain could no 
longer issue currency if  unable to find buyers for its debt. Furthermore, in an 
effort to tackle the insolvency of  a growing number of  financial institutions, 
the government and the central bank pursued a policy of  forced bank merg-
ers and privatisation of  savings banks, which has turned out to be a complete 
fiasco. This policy has led to the virtual disappearance of  institutions whose 
origins date to the nineteenth century and an unprecedented socialisation of 
losses. 
In the spring of  2010, major creditors informed the Spanish prime minis-
ter that they were unwilling to continue buying public debt unless there was 
a radical change of  policy. Speculators started to demand higher premiums 
to buy Spanish debt. 
From that point on, Zapatero’s government changed the policy direction 
and began to implement what could be called the Berlin Consensus, impos-
ing a severe fiscal adjustment that was to have a particularly significant im-
pact on workers’ wages, public investment and social expenditure. The Popu-
lar Party government of Mariano Rajoy, which took office in 2012, continued 
down the same path. A draconian labour reform was implemented, the tax 
burden was further increased, and a European loan of  up to €100 billion 
—guaranteed by the Spanish budget— was negotiated to recapitalise insol-
vent financial institutions.  
The route of  internal devaluation, adopted in May 2010, has barely made 
a dent in the deficit, which after the 2012 bank rescue was again around 11 
per cent of  GDP. The public debt has soared to 84.2 per cent of  GDP, and 
unemployment reached a historic high of  27 per cent in the spring of  2013. 
According to our indicator, Spain has now gone through a gruelling six-year 
slump. Moreover, the problem is not confined to the Iberian Peninsula. A 
number of  peripheral EU states (the so-called PIIGS or GIPSI) are affected, 
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and unlike Sweden or Denmark, these are countries that embraced the euro 
with blind enthusiasm.
Conclusions
For the purposes of  this paper, we have defined a crisis as a period during 
which real GDP per capita remains below the previously recorded peak. When 
this criterion is applied to a sample of  12 economies representative of  the glo-
bal economy, we find that the worst moment between 1928 and 2013 was the 
three-year period from 1931 to 1933 (when 11 countries were experiencing a 
slump). The crisis was caused by the speculative excesses of  Wall Street be-
tween 1926 and 1929, and the contractionary policies subsequently imple-
mented turned it into a Great Depression. Since the crisis was one of  effec-
tive demand and therefore entailed generalised deflation, countries that applied 
expansionary policies and broke the rules of the gold standard recovered more 
quickly. 
Crises became less frequent after 1945 thanks to the Bretton Woods Agree-
ments and the application of  demand-management policies. The former al-
lowed for devaluation and establishment of  exchange controls on capital 
movements; the latter made it possible to expand the economy when the prob-
lem was lack of  growth and cause it to contract when inflation was the great-
er risk. As a result, the number of  countries in crisis gradually decreased un-
til they practically disappeared in the 1970s.
From 1974, crises became more frequent again. Those which occurred 
during the period of  stagflation were caused mainly by oil shocks, but short-
sighted lending practices in the lightly regulated Eurodollar market also had 
a destabilising effect. The simultaneous occurrence of  inflation and a drop in 
economic activity posed a significant dilemma for demand-management pol-
icies. Countries that controlled inflation from the outset and were prudent in 
their use of  credit experienced milder crises than those which adopted highly 
expansionary policies, allowed inflation to accelerate, and relied heavily on 
external financing. Countries that took the latter approach ended up requir-
ing severe adjustments that had a high cost in terms of  real growth.
The main slumps since 1990 have again been caused by the speculative ex-
cesses of  deregulated capital markets, which were rapidly liberalised in a con-
text of  lax monetary policy. Europe’s process of  unification by half  measures 
also contributed to increasing global instability. With ten of  the sample coun-
tries in crisis in 2009, the current slump is the most intense to hit the global 
economy since 1945. Like the gold standard in the interwar period, at the out-
set of  the twenty-first century the dream of the euro led much of  Europe into 
an economic catastrophe.
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■
From the Great Depression to the Euro Crisis, 1929-2013: A Global Approach
aBstRaCt
This article identifies the main global crises that have occurred since 1929 and analyses their 
causes by focusing on a sample of 12 significant economies. A comparative historical analysis 
is used to show that major global slumps resulted from a combination of excessive speculation 
in financial markets and government mishandling of demand-management policies.
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■
De la Gran Depresión a la crisis del euro, 1929-2013: un enfoque global
Resumen
Este artículo identifica las principales crisis globales desde 1929 y analiza sus causas, a 
partir del estudio de una muestra de 12 economías relevantes. Utiliza la historia comparativa 
para postular que las grandes depresiones globales han derivado de la combinación de excesos 
de especulación financiera y la falta de acierto en la aplicación de políticas de regulación de la 
demanda. 
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